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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite Indonesia’s overall achievements during the past two decades, the economy is encountering a 
series of problems. One of the biggest challenges is the unsatisfactory performance of the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Subsidisies and uncovered loans to the SOEs have drained the government’s fiscal 
resources, and the signing off of employees creates many social problems. Compared with the SOEs in other 
sectors, state-owned sugar mills face more serious crises which not only jeopardise the social fabric, but also 
endanger the production. Research results strengthen the statement that the basic problem in sugar mills is 
management inefficiency resulting in high transaction costs. This research compares the transaction costs 
between state-owned (Ngadiredjo) and privately-owned (Kebon Agung) sugar mills. The study shows that in 
Kebon Agung Sugar Mill transaction costs are higher than production costs, while in Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill 
the reverse is true. However, the high transaction costs in Kebon Agung Sugar Mill cannot be attributed 
directly to inefficient institutions, because Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill incurred high costs for plants, land 
preparation, and fertilizer, which decreased the proportion of transaction costs. If analyzed in detail, the 
following facts are revealed: (i) market transaction costs in Kebon Agung Sugar Mill are higher than in 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill. This is because Kebon Agung Sugar Mill has established cooperation with sugarcane 
farmers in the form of extensions and transport subsidies; and  (ii) the political transaction costs proportion in 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill is higher than in Kebon Agung Sugar Mill because of the imposition of many ‘illegal’ 
fees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background   
Problems that have been encountered by the 
sugar industry in Indonesia recently are very complex, 
and are both internal and external. Generally, if we 
categorize, the sugar industry has four basic problems, 
i.e.: (i) inefficiency at the farmers’ level; (ii) 
inefficiency at the sugar mill level; (iii) government 
policy has not effectively stimulated the development 
of the national sugar industry; and (iv) the sugar 
industry and trading are very distorted in the 
international market (SUSILA, 2002:A4-8). Specifi-
cally, inefficiency at the sugar mill level is caused by 
the sugar mills being too old and by management of 
the sugar mills that is still traditional. This reality 
means that sugarcane cannot be well-processed 
(milled) so that the result is not maximal. If we 
describe based on ownership, privately-owned sugar 
mills are generally more efficient than are state-
owned sugar mills (PRABOWO, 1998:12). This is 
because most of the privately-owned sugar mills are 
more newly established so that their technology is 
better and they are managed with a more professional 
management system compared with state-owned 
sugar mills. 
In detail, management and technology cause a 
decrease in sugar mill performance. Some assump-
tions state that in general sugar industries in Indonesia 
are still efficient, although there are about 27 sugar 
mills that have problems and are inefficient. 
According to International LMC (1997), in the case of 
efficiency, Indonesian sugar industries occupy 21–30 
ranks from 62 sugar producers in the world, with 
production costs of US$288 – 310 per ton. As a 
comparison, average production costs of the 15 
countries most efficient are US$301.5 per ton 
(HUSODO, 1999:14). Yet given the fact that the total 
number of sugar mills in Indonesia nowadays remains 
at 64 units (compared with the total number of sugar 
mills in 1930 which reached 182 units), the 
assumption that sugar mills in Indonesia are not 
efficient is reasonable. One of the reasons a sugar mill 
is closed is because of the inadequacy of raw material 
(sugarcane) from sugarcane farmers. However, what 
we should not ignore is management performance of 
the sugar industry that is bad as a result of high spend-
control.  
1
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Problem Setting 
However, there is one thing that escaped the 
notice of analysts of the sugar mill in Indonesia: that 
the decreasing performance of the sugar mill is caused 
by inefficiency of institutions in managing the 
relationships among economic actors in the sugar 
industry: 
Theoretically, efficiency can be categorized as 
two types: technical efficiency and economic 
efficiency. In sugar production, technical 
efficiency refers to high crystal productivity that 
depends on sugar productivity and sucrose 
content rate. For sugar mills, technical efficiency 
is influenced by duration of mill time and 
capacity of the real mill. Meanwhile, economic 
efficiency is based on the production cost to 
produce the amount of the same product. See 
Dibyo PRABOWO, Antisipasi Industri Gula 
Menghadapi Ketidakpastian Ekonomi, Gula 
Indonesia, Vol. XXIII, Vol. 4, October – 
December 1998, p. 14 
  
The institutional inefficiency can be detected in 
the high transaction costs in the sugar mill. In the 
sugar mill level, there is much evidence that 
management is not efficient, which raises many costs. 
For example, sugar mills must ask for approval from 
the director (PTPN) for buying equipment/machines, 
but the process takes a very long time because it is the 
PTPN itself that will buy the tools. This is disruptive 
to the production process. Government policies also 
burden sugar mills with things such as multiple 
taxation for water needs. There is much taxation 
conducted by government officials (from central to 
local) for various interests, which also raise 
transaction costs in the sugar mills. Accumulation 
from all of the institutional issues results in 
inefficiency of the sugar mill in Indonesia. From this 
perspective, inefficiency in the sugar mill can be seen 
not only in terms of production costs but also of 
transaction costs generated.   
 
Research Objective 
This research aims to describe the configuration 
of transaction costs of the sugar mill in East Java. 
Specifically, this research will describe the structure 
of corporate governance influencing the cost structure 
of sugar mills. Analysis of corporate governance will 
show whether the sugar mills’ rules of the game are 
already efficient or not. This research uses the 
transaction cost economics perspective, because this 
approach is one of appropriate analysis to evaluate the 
efficiency of economic institutions. This research also 
uses the comparative approach between the two 
different institutions, state-owned and privately-
owned sugar mills, in order to identify which is more 
efficient for the sugar mill in East Java.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) views firms 
as governance structures, replacing the neoclassical 
view of them as production functions. In the latter, 
once the quantities of inputs used in a production 
process are specified, exogenous technological 
considerations will fix the quantity of output (or an 
efficient frontier linking quantities of multiple 
outputs). In the TCE view, the differing degrees of 
sunkenness of different inputs will affect the behavior 
of their owners, unobservability of quality or effort 
will influence the effectiveness of other inputs, 
managerial quality and effort will determine how well 
the inputs are combined, and so on. The mechanisms 
that are in place to counter these transaction-cost 
problems, for example, incentive schemes, will also 
influence the behavior of the various parties. In other 
words, organizational and governance structures of 
firms will have an important impact on what they do 
(DIXIT, 1996:51). In interpreting the transaction costs 
within a firm, it may be helpful to understand the 
‘exchanges’ as ‘contractual arrangements.’ Firms’ 
transactions involve the contractual arrangement of 
factors of production, while markets involve the 
contractual arrangement of outputs (ZHANG, 
2000:287). 
FURUBOTN and RICHTER (as quoted by BENHAM 
and BENHAM, 2000:368) pointed out typical 
examples of transaction costs are the costs of using 
the market (market transaction costs) and the costs of 
exercising the right to give orders within the firm 
(managerial transaction costs). There is also the array 
of costs associated with the running and adjusting of 
the institutional framework of a polity (political 
transaction costs). For each of these three types of 
transaction costs, it is possible to recognize two 
variants: (1) “fixed” transaction costs, that is, the 
specific investments made in setting up institutional 
arrangements; and (2) “variable” transaction costs, 
that is, costs that depend on the number or volume of 
transactions. 
The costs of using the market (market transaction 
costs) may be classified in more detail as follows: (1) 
the costs of preparing contracts (search and 
information costs narrowly defined), (2) the costs of 
concluding contracts (costs of bargaining and decision 
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making), and (3) the costs of monitoring and 
enforcing the contractual obligations. Managerial 
transaction costs reduce to the following: (1) the costs 
of setting up, maintaining or changing an 
organizational design. Such costs relate to a rather 
wide array of operations. These are typically fixed 
transaction costs; and (2) the costs of running an 
organization, which fall largely into two subcate-
gories: (a) information costs; and (b) the costs 
associated with the physical transfer of goods and 
services across a separable interface. Finally, political 
transaction costs deals with the provision of such 
organization and the public goods associated with it. 
They are, in a general sense, the costs of supplying 
public goods by collective action, and they can be 
understood as analogous to managerial transaction 
costs. Specifically, these are: (1) the costs of setting 
up, maintaining and changing a system’s formal and 
informal political organization; (2) the costs of 
running polity. These are current expenditures for 
those things formerly specified as the “duties of the 
sovereign” (FURUBOTN and RICHTER, 2000:44-47).  
In the context of firms, STRASSMANN (2002:7) 
identifies transaction costs as costs of the organization 
of employees and users; information processing; 
coordination of suppliers; costs of acquisition; 
motivation of customers; managing distributors; 
compliance with regulations; satisfying shareholders 
and lenders; fees, commissions, tolls and taxes; and 
research and development. In another way, UNDP 
(2000:15) classified transaction costs into three forms. 
First, administrative costs. These arise from inputs of 
resources needed for transactions. Most include 
administrative overheads, in particular, staff time. 
Second, indirect costs. These result from the impact of 
the delivery mechanism on the achievement of 
development goals, for instance, transport subsidy and 
cut-load-carry activity. Third, opportunity costs. 
These measure the benefits forgone from alternative 
applications of the decision-making activities, espe-
cially the trade-off between centralistic and decentra-
listic managements: 
Besides interest expenses, POLSKI also formu-
lated non-interest expenses, which consist of (1) 
employee salaries and benefits; (2) occupancy 
expenses; and (3) other miscellaneous expenses, 
i.e. fees paid to directors, trustees and advisory 
board members, legal fees, advertising, public 
relations and promotions, charitable contribu-
tions, office supplies, information processing, 
telephone expenses, examination and audit fees 
and so on. See Margaret M. POLSKI, Measuring 
Transaction Costs and Institutional Change in 
the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry, Paper 
presented for the Annual Conference of the 
International Society for New Institutional 
Economics, 2000, Tübingen, Germany, p.17   
 
Ownership Problems and Corporate Governance 
In macro-perspective, one of the main issues 
relating to the firm is the ownership problem. The 
choice of public versus private provision depends on 
how different ownership patterns affect the incentives 
to deliver this non-contractible quality, as well as on 
the cost of such delivery. The efficiency concept here 
is intended to incorporate fully the social value of 
quality. To focus on both efficiency and quality, 
HART, SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1997) consider two 
types of investment incentives: those to reduce costs 
and those to improve quality or innovate (SHLEIFER, 
1998:137-138). When assets are publicly owned, the 
public manager has relatively weak incentives to 
make either of these investments, because this 
manager is not the owner and hence gets only a 
fraction of the return. In contrast, private regulated 
contractors have much stronger incentives because, as 
owners, they get more of the returns on the invest-
ment. Which ownership structure is more efficient 
depends on whether having high-powered incentives 
to invest and innovate is a good idea.  
Corporate governance issues arise in an organi-
zation whenever two conditions are present (HART, 
1995:680). First, there is an agency problem; these 
might be owners, managers, workers, or consumers. 
Second, transaction costs are such that this agency 
problem cannot be dealt with through a contract. In a 
world of incomplete contracts (where agency 
problems are also present), governance structure does 
have a role. Governance structure can be seen as a 
mechanism for making decisions that have not been 
specified in the initial contract. More precisely, 
governance structure allocates residual rights of 
control over the firm’s nonhuman assets; that is, the 
right to decide how these assets should be used, given 
that a usage has not been specified in an initial 
contract. In the context of this corporate governance, 
one important issue is the mechanism for controlling 
management. 
Finally, the transaction cost approach to the study 
of organizations has been applied at three levels of 
analysis (WILLIAMSON, 1981:549). The first is the 
overall structure of the enterprise. This takes the scope 
of the enterprise as given and asks how the operating 
parts should be related one to another. Unitary, 
holding company, and multidivisional forms come 
under scrutiny when these issues are addressed. The 
second or middle level focuses on the operating parts 
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and ask which activities should be performed within 
the firm, which outside it, and why. This can be 
thought of as developing the criteria for and defining 
the “efficient boundaries” of an operating unit. The 
third level of analysis is concerned with the manner in 
which human assets are organized. The object here is 
to match internal governance structures with the 
attributes of works groups in a discriminating way. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Location 
The survey was carried out in two different 
regions in East Java - Indonesia, because about 40% 
of sugar mills have been operating in this area. The 
researcher intends to take samples of two kinds of 
sugar mills in East Java. First, a state-owned sugar 
mill is represented by Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill in Kediri 
District. Second, a privately-owned sugar mill is 
represented by Kebon Agung Sugar Mill in Malang 
District. The two sugar mills were chosen due to 
having the same production scale. Malang and Kediri 
Districts, chosen as locations for this research, are also 
relatively attractive regions (from an economic point 
of view) compared with other districts in East Java.  
 
Data Sources  
Primary data was collected by using individual 
in-depth interviews are taken to obtain more detailed 
information. The person interviewed was free to voice 
his/her own expressions/ideas in an unstructured 
interview. The interviewer relied on open questions to 
introduce topics of interest without the interviewer 
imposing his ideas. Also, the researcher used key 
informants to collect information: 
Perhaps the single most important diagnostic 
feature of good qualitative enquiry is its full 
exploitation of insights from key informants. By 
key informants we mean persons whose position 
or previous experience gives them particularly 
valuable information on a give topic. If the basis 
is position, the key informant becomes, in effect, 
a surrogate observer for the investigator. On the 
other hand, if the basis is experience, the 
informant provides the investigator with a chance 
to view information from other sources in 
historical perspective–in effect a longitudinal 
‘time slice’. See Jon MORIS and James 
COPESTAKE, Qualitative Enquiry for Rural 
Development, Intermediate Technology Publica-
tions on Behalf of the Overseas Development 
Institute, 1993, London, p. 58 
 The study of the sugar mills is expected to reveal 
processing, marketing, contract system, and enforce-
ment procedures in the sugar mills. Besides empirical 
research, data was also collected from financial 
annual reports of the sugar mills. Data and 
information gained from field observation and by 
interviewing some key-informants turned out to be 
valuable for this study. 
  
Method of Analysis 
In general, the data that are used in this research 
are based on the annual financial report of Kebon 
Agung and Ngadiredjo Sugar Mills (1999-2004). The 
data is classified into two types, i.e. production and 
transaction costs. The researcher used the ABC 
(Activity-Based Costing) approach to classify the 
types of costs (see Figure 1). Activity-based costing 
is an accounting methodology that assigns costs to 
activities rather than products or services. This 
enables resource and overhead costs to be more 
accurately assigned to the products and the services 
that incur them.  In addition, other data were attained 
through interviews and key persons (accounting unit) 
in sugar mills in order to get the data that are not 
written in annual financial reports, such as 
overlapping activities costs. Decision-making costs 
were calculated through special measurement, i.e. by 
calculating the costs arising due to the lateness of 
decision-making.  
 
 
Source: Own depiction, 2004 
 
Figure 1. Classification Process of Production and 
Transaction Costs 
               
Classification of Variables in the Sugar Mills 
Another aspect that must be clarified in 
determining the production and transaction costs’ 
variables is the classification of fixed and variable 
costs. When analysing production costs at the firm 
level, fixed costs usually relate to the initial 
investment of the firm, such as the value of machines 
and building depreciation. In the case of Kebon 
Agung and Ngadiredjo Sugar Mills, “fixed” 
production costs in the form of machine and building 
depreciation are difficult to ascertain. First, the data is 
not available in the annual financial report of the sugar 
mill. Second, the sugar mills’ ages are very old; 
therefore, machine and building depreciation costs are 
not relevant anymore. However, “fixed” production 
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costs that are relevant to be applied to the sugar mill 
are costs for milling preparation, machine spare parts, 
and labor wage (for contract labor). The “variable” 
production costs (which depend on the number or 
volume of production) of the sugar mill are milling 
machines, fuel oil, overtime pay, chemicals, land 
processing, and so on: 
Also based on LEWIS’S category (1993), 
production costs can also be classified based on 
direct and indirect costs. See Prasert 
NAKCHAROEN and K.J. (Jamies) ROGERS, 
Activity-Based Costing Approach to Equipment 
Selection Problem for Flexible Manufacturing 
Systems, Internet Source: http://arri.uta. edu/eif/ 
prasertierc.pdf (October 7, 2004), 2004, p. 1. 
Direct costs include costs for labor wage, 
overtime pay, chemicals, land processing, and 
fuel oil; and indirect costs include costs for 
milling preparation, spare parts, packaging, and 
complements.   
    
“Fixed” transaction costs generally relate to the 
specific investments made in setting up institutional 
arrangements, while “variable” transaction costs 
concern costs that depend on the number or volume 
of transactions (FURUBOTN and RICHTER, 2000:43). 
According to COLLINS and FABOZZI (1991:27-28), 
the fixed component is easy to measure, as it consists 
of commissions, taxes, and transfer fees. Unfor-
tunately, the fixed component is much smaller than 
the variable component, and the latter is much harder 
to measure. Based on the definition, ‘fixed’ 
transaction cost variables in sugar mills are costs for 
extensions, research and development, firm building 
and facilities, general facilities, managers and 
administrators, vehicles/cars, special costs, staff and 
labor allowances, security, donations, taxes, and 
miscellaneous. Furthermore, ‘variable’ transaction 
costs include costs for transportation, bonuses, cut-
load-carry, smallholders’ contracts, outside-of-estate 
costs, electricity, salaries, overtime pay, decision-
making, and overlapping activities.  
 
Measuring Transaction Costs of Sugar Mills 
 
In the case of sugar mills, the transaction costs 
can be classified into the variables as follows: (i) 
market transaction costs (transport subsidies, bonuses, 
and extensions); (ii) managerial transaction costs  
(salaries/wages for administrative workers, food, 
facilities, equipment, special costs, electricity, staff 
allowances, health, spare parts, telecommunications, 
maintenance, official transport, pensions, fire brigade, 
decision-making, overlapping activities); and (iii) 
political transaction costs (taxes, tax duplication, 
donations, security, and miscellaneous costs). Most of 
these variables are explicit (which means the 
researcher can get data from the annual financial 
report of the sugar mill). However, a few of the 
variables, such as decision-making, tax duplication, 
and overlapping activities costs must be approached 
with special calculations, because sugar mill officers 
usually do not calculate these variables (implicit). For 
the variables, the measurement can be explained as 
follows: 
• Decision-making = Costs of decision-making 
delay. Cost of the decision-making process is 
taken from two sources: (i) a milling machine 
stopped operating temporarily because of waiting 
for the machine spare parts that came late. From 
the total operational stoppage the sugar mill lost its 
chance to produce some sugar. The milling stop 
cost is calculated based on sugar loss multiplied by 
sugar price; and (ii) employees that have been 
contracted have no duties during the milling 
machine stoppage. The employees are given a 
wage rate/day, and this is multiplied by the 
number of employees to generate transaction costs 
(implicit). 
• Duplication tax = Cost of duplication tax is 
measured from water tax during the milling 
season (for six months/180 working days; this is 
only the case for Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill). In the 
milling season Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill is charged a 
water tax by two government agencies: Board of 
Kediri Revenue (Dispenda) and a state-owned 
water firm (Perum Jasa Tirta). Each agent draws 
tax Rp 62.5 million/month for the same object. 
From duplication of this water tax, Ngadiredjo 
Sugar Mill bears total costs Rp 375 million 
(implicit). 
• Overlapping activities = This cost exists because 
one activity is conducted by two divisions (this is 
only the case for Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill). The 
measurement is based on the calculations of the 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill Accountancy Unit 
(implicit).  
 
However, at the micro level (firm level), one 
complex problem is how to identify fixed costs that 
are not recorded in financial reports, such as 
marketing costs, research and development, and 
activities’ duplication.  These are real costs but were 
not included among expenditures listed by firms 
(sugar mills); therefore, they are very hard to 
determine (sunken costs).  In the case of research and 
development activities at the Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill, 
expenditures were reported separately; therefore, it 
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was easy to measure. However, research and 
development activities were not recorded in the 
Kebon Agung Sugar Mill financial report, which was 
concerned with marketing costs and activities’ 
duplication. The researcher coped with this problem 
in two ways. First, he conducted an in-depth 
interview with the head of the accounting unit in order 
to get a description and measurement of transaction 
costs, for example activity duplication caused by 
inefficient management at Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill.  
Second, he identified the real activities of the firm 
(sugar mill), both in Kebon Agung and Ngadiredjo 
Sugar Mills, in order to get a proper description of 
activities at the firm level.  It was clear from this that 
there was no research and development activity at 
Kebon Agung Sugar Mill.  Furthermore, there was no 
marketing activity at either Kebon Agung or 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill. 
 
RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
Configuration of Production and Transaction 
Costs of Sugar Mills 
Based on the above definitions, a sugar mill’s 
transaction costs are complex, because its operation is 
generally similar to other big enterprises that have 
assets, human resources, and a decision-making 
hierarchy. All of these characteristics generate various 
kinds of transaction costs. Beyond this, in the context 
of market transaction costs, sugar mills are also 
related to many parties, such as sugarcane farmers, 
cooperatives, distributors, law institutions (notaries), 
banks, and so on. In many cases, these relationships 
concern the processes of getting raw material and of 
distributing sugar. Finally, the sugar mill also deals 
with government policy (political transaction costs) 
in order to run its business smoothly. These 
transaction costs include tax payments, security, 
donations, tax duplication, and miscellaneous costs. 
All of these activities create a configuration of 
transaction costs for the sugar mill.  
Sugar mill managerial transaction costs can be 
divided into two groups. Internal managerial transac-
tion costs are defined as transaction costs generated 
from the corporate internal management model, for 
example policies of wage rate, facilities, and 
maintenance. At this level, the amount of transaction 
costs depends on how efficient the management 
institution is in supporting the production process. 
External managerial transaction costs are transaction 
costs related to the authority of the management in 
decision-making. In the case of the sugar mill in East 
Java, in general the sugar mill management (Chief 
Executive Officer, hereafter CEO) does not have 
absolute authority to make decisions because all 
proposals must get approval from the Board of 
Directors (hereafter BoD) [PTPN for state-owned 
sugar mill/PG. Ngadiredjo and PT. RNI for privately-
owned sugar mill/PG. Kebon Agung]. The problem is 
that the BoD often does not know exactly the real 
needs of the sugar mill so that the BoD disturbs the 
production process. In this case, centralized decision-
making management generates high transaction costs 
for the sugar mill, which indicates institutional 
inefficiency in the corporation’s management. 
For political transaction costs, the sugar mill has 
both legal and illegal expenses related to government 
policy adjustment. Legal transaction costs are, for 
example, tax payments, contribution to research 
institution (P3GI), donation to APTR, and so on. 
Illegal transaction costs are donations to security, local 
government (for incidental activities), etc. Formally, 
the latter cost actually is not compulsory (it is 
voluntary). However, in fact, if the sugar mill does not 
pay the donation, the sugar mill will find it difficult to 
deal with government bureaucracies, for example, 
taxation and licensing. With this consideration, the 
sugar mill usually feels compelled to give the 
donations. This fact is commonly found in almost all 
enterprises, not only in sugar mills. In one study, the 
political transaction costs (legal and illegal), even 
reached 20-30% of the total corporations’ costs in 
Indonesia (PASARIBU, 1996:66). Thus, this factor is 
regarded as a source of institutional inefficiency of the 
sugar industry in Indonesia. In detail, components of 
transaction costs in Kebon Agung and Ngadiredjo 
Sugar Mills can be seen in Tables 1 and Tables 2, 
respectively: 
Besides the above components, there are some 
transaction costs that are not reported in the 
annual financial report of a sugar mill. First are 
transaction costs which resulted from hierarchy in 
the process of decision-making. For example, the 
sugar mill management proposes to purchase 
machines to directors (PTPN), but in fact the 
machines come late (about two months). 
Transaction costs are calculated as the costs 
generated from the delay, such as the number of 
outputs failed to be produced and laborers off 
duty. Second are transaction costs in the form of 
duplication of tax payments as a result of the 
decentralization policy since 2001. For example, 
every month in the milling season Ngadiredjo 
Sugar Mill is charged a duplicate tax payment for 
water, which is collected by DISPENDA (Dinas 
Pendapatan Daerah/Board of District Revenue) 
and Perum Jasa Tirta (Water District Company). 
Third are transaction costs due to machines not 
functioning during the milling season. Common-
ly a machine stopped working for one of two 
reasons: (i) predetermined schedule; and (ii) 
machine is broken. Fourth are transaction costs 
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that result from overlapping of activities because 
of the corporate management model, for 
example, purchasing of goods by two divisions: 
administration and fabrication. 
 
Table 1. Categories of Transaction Costs in Kebon 
Agung Sugar Mill 
Categories Description Expendi-
ture 
Market Transaction Costs 
Extension Payment for conducting farmers’ 
extensions  
Explicit 
Bonuses/premium Payment for sugarcane quality 
premium and clean-fresh-sweet 
(BSM) sugarcane premium  
Explicit 
Transport subsidy Costs of farmers’ transportation 
subsidy  
Explicit 
Managerial Transaction Costs 
Salaries/wages Payment for permanent 
(administrative/ management) 
labor wage  
Explicit 
Firm facilities Cost of education and 
training,clinic medicine, sports, 
and work security 
Explicit 
Food/meal costs Costs of staff/management meal Explicit 
Pension costs Payment for staff/labor who have 
pensions 
Explicit 
Telecommunications Payments for sending letters, 
telephone, fax, and others 
Explicit 
 
Equipment 
Cost of purchasing cutting tools, 
general equipment/building 
materials, print goods, and 
books/newspapers/magazines 
 
Explicit 
Spare parts Costs of purcashing locomotive, 
lorry, draisin, vehicle, and 
agriculture tools 
Explicit 
 
Special costs 
Costs of bank/postage stamps, 
infrastructure, accomodations, 
accountant/consultant, testing, and 
compous operational  
 
Explicit 
Electricity Payment for water, electricity and 
off-milling season (LMG) 
electricity  
Explicit 
 
Staff/labor allowance 
Payment for leave (holiday), labor 
insurance, labor/staff retired, 
working period, and social 
security 
 
Explicit 
Health Costs of staff and non-staff health Explicit 
Maintenance Costs of machine maintenance 
and repair 
Explicit 
Official transport Payment for staff/management 
official transport 
Explicit 
Fire brigade (safety)  Costs of fire security  Explicit 
Decision-making  Costs of decision-making delay Implicit 
Political Transaction Costs 
Taxes Taxes on land and building 
(PBB), revenue (PPh) on land 
rent and service, and other taxes 
Explicit 
Security Costs of factory security 
(satpam), plantation, and milling 
Explicit 
Miscellaneous cost Costs of unknown use, but always 
present in each post/division 
expenditure 
Explicit 
 Source: Own research, 2005 
Table 2. Categories of Transaction Costs in Nga-
diredjo Sugar Mill 
Categories Description Expendi-
ture 
Market Transaction Costs 
Transportation cost Cost of transportation to carry 
sugarcane to sugar mill  
Explicit
Cut-load-carry Costs of transporting 
smallholder-owned sugarcane  
Explicit
Smallholder contract Cost of making contract with 
farmers 
Explicit
Managerial Transaction Costs 
 
Outside of estate cost 
Costs of sugarcane transportation 
tools, agricultural tools, repair 
division, remise, garage, 
warehouse, and pemel  
 
Explicit
Machine and 
installation 
maintenance 
Cost of milling machine 
maintenance 
Explicit
Research and 
development 
Costs of research and 
development (R&D) 
Explicit
Right on land Tax of sugar mill-owned land Explicit
Firm building Costs of factory renovation and 
office 
Explicit
Firm facilities Costs of chief and staff official 
house, hospital (clinic), and 
social building 
Explicit
 
General facilities  
Costs of building street, bridge, 
waterworks (canal), permanent 
lorry rail, non-permanent lorry 
rail, pemel street and bridge, 
water retribution, rubbish 
installation  
 
Explicit
Managers and 
administrative 
Payments for chief and 
administrative activities 
Explicit
Central electricity Payments for office, machine, 
and other electricity  
Explicit
 
Vehicle/car 
Costs of vehicle maintenance 
(car, bus, jeep, pick-up, 
landrover, truck), locomotive and 
lorry, draisine and rail 
motorcycle, motorcycle, and 
wheel tractor 
 
Explicit
Salaries/wages Payments for permanent 
(management/administrative) 
labor wage  
Explicit
 
Staff allowance 
Payments for structural 
functions, tax, house 
rent/electricity/water, pension, 
labor insurance (Jamsostek), and 
pension social security 
 
Explicit
Labor allowance Payments for irregular labor 
welfare, such as labor insurance 
and social security  
Explicit
Overtime honorarium  Payment for milling labor 
overtime premium, especially in 
milling period 
Explicit
Security  Costs of factory security 
(satpam), and waiting cost 
Explicit
Cane security Costs of security in smallholder 
farmers’ land in harvest period 
Explicit
General costs Costs of unknown origin (un-
detailed) in financial report  
Explicit
Decision-making  Costs of decision-making delay  Implicit
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Political Transaction Costs 
Miscellaneous costs Costs of unknown use, but 
always present in each 
post/division expenditure 
Explicit
Donations Donation for village, local 
government, mosque, national 
day celebration, and others 
Explicit
Tax duplication Double payments for one tax 
object (water tax) 
Implicit
 
Taxes 
Payments for revenue tax, value 
additional tax (PPn input), value 
additional tax (PPn output), and 
corporation tax (PPn Badan)   
 
Explicit
 
Overlapping activities  
Costs arise because one activity 
is done by two different 
divisions, for example 
transportation costs and official 
house 
 
Implicit
Source: Own research (treated), 2005 
 
On the contrary, as seen in Table 3, the types of 
production costs are simpler than transaction costs. In 
Kebon Agung Sugar Mill, production costs include 
milling preparation, wages/salaries for permanent and 
impermanent laborers in the milling division, over-
time honorarium, restitution of sugarcane farmers’ 
sacks, the process of milling sugarcane, the acquisi-
tion of corporate spare parts, complements costs, and 
land processing. In Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill, production 
costs include: the process of milling the sugarcane, 
corporate and processing needs, fuel station, besali, 
overtime honorarium, milling laborers’ incentives, 
fuel, salaries of workers in the milling division, sugar 
packaging, purchases by the tools investigator, plant 
costs, land processing, fertilizer and material, and seed 
estate. In general, there is no difference in production 
costs between Kebon Agung and Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mills, because the raw material and the output have 
the same characteristics. The identification makes it 
easy to trace the total production costs for each sugar 
mill. 
 
Table 3. Categories of Sugar Mills’ Production 
Costs 
No Kebon Agung Sugar Mill Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill 
1 Milling machine and 
preparation 
Sugarcane milling and 
water pump 
2 Labor wage (irregular labor)  Labor wage (irregular 
labor) 
3 Fuel oil Fuel oil  
4 Overtime honorarium Overtime honorarium 
5 Chemistry material  Material and tools 
6 Lubricating oil Fuel station  
7 Packaging and sack 
restitution 
Packaging 
8 Machine spare parts Factory, processing, and 
besali 
9 Milled seed Seed estate 
10 Land processing Land processing 
11 Complement costs Plant costs, fertilizer, and 
material 
Source: Own research (treated), 2005 
Production and Transaction Costs in the Sugar 
Mills 
 
Production and Transaction Costs in Kebon 
Agung Sugar Mill 
Data in Table 4. shows the composition of 
production costs of Kebon Agung Sugar Mill. Some 
interesting things found were as follows: (i) the 
highest percentage of production costs was from 
milling/preparation activities, about 36% of total 
production costs in 2003. The milling/preparation 
activities include machinery maintenance, milling 
machine tests, and labor wages involved in the 
process of milling preparation. The magnitude of this 
milling/preparation cost indicates two possibilities: 
there are many broken machines that need to be 
repaired and sugar mill management is not efficient so 
that it cannot manage the optimal milling/preparation 
cost. After that, the second highest expenses were 
acquisition of fuel, chemical materials, overtime 
wages, labor wages, and the milling station; (ii) labor 
wage expenditure in the milling division, especially 
for irregular labor, declined drastically in 2003 
compared with the previous year. The declining labor 
wage expenditure was caused by the success of the 
sugar mill management in restructuring the working 
system to reduce its labor and overtime, so that it did 
not need as much labor or overtime; (iii) expenditures 
for purchasing chemical materials increased (more 
than 100%) as a result of the increasing price of the 
chemical materials; and (iv) there was a high decrease 
of DMG fuel purchasing (in the milling season) due 
to declining production and milling days in 2003, 
which saved fuel consumption.  
 
Table 4. Production Costs of Kebon Agung Sugar 
Mill (Rp million) 
Production Cost 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mill machine/ 
preparation 
3,680 3,633 5,271 8,325 9,219
Wages (irregular 
labor) 
2,202 4,013 6,639 6,766 1,498
Overtime honorarium 1,755 2,453 4,343 3,948 2,219
Purchasing of 
chemical materials 
967 1,236 1,619 1,684 3,606
Lubricating oil 488 488 755 767 748
Fuel oil  429 2,053 6,493 6,534 3,699
Packaging & sack  
restit. 
- - 386 194 59
Milled seed 130 - 745 - -
Machine spare parts 539 570 406 635 507
Complement costs 4,937 1,569 2,018 1,656 939
Land preparation 1,860 4,844 6,988 4,980 2,696
Total production costs 16,987 20,876 35,663 35,489 25,190
Note: The numbers in this table have been rounded  
Source: Own research (treated), 2005 
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With regard to transaction costs composition, 
Table 5  shows data as follows: (i) labor wage of 
permanent workers increased sharply (about 100%) in 
2003. This was due to the change in workers’ 
composition, because many workers who were 
previously on irregular (non-permanent) status were 
promoted to be permanent workers in 2003. If we 
trace in depth, this permanent workers’ wage 
contributed the highest percentage to the total 
transaction costs, reaching 25%. After that, the next 
highest expenses were pension costs, staff/labor 
allowances, and transportation subsidy; (ii) 
expenditure for equipment also increased greatly, up 
300% in 2003. This increase was because of the 
building and renovation of sugar mill officials’ 
houses. As additional information, almost all of the 
sugar mill’s staff receives the facilities of official 
houses; (iii) in special costs posts, there was also a 
sharp increase in expenditure, 600% in 2003. From 
the total special costs that reached Rp 2.4 billion, most 
of them (about Rp 1.5 billion) are used to pay a public 
consultant (accountant) service, mainly to calculate 
the company’s tax; (iv) expenditure for workers’ 
incentives also increased greatly, about 35%. This 
increase resulted from the fact there were many 
members of the sugar mill’s staff who retired, which 
obliged the company to give pension incentives; and 
(v) transportation costs also increased about 100% in 
2003. This increase was because the sugar mill 
increased the transportation subsidy to Rp 
5000/quintal of sugarcane (from previously Rp 
1500/quintal of sugarcane in 2002) to prevent 
sugarcane farmers’ selling their sugarcane to another 
sugar mill. Therefore, although the amount of 
sugarcane processed in Kebon Agung Sugar Mill 
declined in 2003, the great increase in the 
transportation subsidy made the total transportation 
subsidy increase. Besides, transaction costs indicate 
an increasing trend, except for certain posts such as 
spare parts for transportation equipment (car), 
telephone, maintenance, and fire brigade.  
From the transaction costs composition, it cannot 
be concluded that the ‘rules of the game’ in Kebon 
Agung Sugar Mill are less efficient because of the 
high transaction costs proportion. In some cases, 
transaction costs serve as a tool to guarantee certainty 
for the sugar mill or welfare for the labor. The 
increasing transportation subsidy, for example, is to 
assure that the sugar mill will not lack raw material. 
With the transportation subsidy, there is incentive for 
farmers to send their sugarcane to Kebon Agung 
Sugar Mill. Labor welfare improvement (for example, 
through improvement of incentives and renovation of 
officials’ houses) is expected to be able to develop 
labor’s commitment and productivity. Therefore, 
although transaction costs increased, in the long term 
it will be useful for Kebon Agung Sugar Mill to 
improve its income with the certainty and labor 
productivity improvements. However, one thing that 
should be considered from transaction costs in Kebon 
Agung Sugar Mill is the change of labor status from 
irregular labor to permanent labor. In fact, sugar mills 
do not need many permanent laborers because most 
activities are concentrated on production activity 
(milling). Meanwhile, the milling process itself –as 
we know– only requires six months per year.  
 
Table 5.  Transaction Costs of Kebon Agung 
Sugar Mill (Rp million) 
Transaction Costs 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market TC 
- Transport subsidy 
- Bonuses 
- Extension 
Sub total 
 
1,407
855
31
2,293
 
4,117 
1,516 
43 
5,676 
 
4,142 
1,927 
51 
6,120 
 
2,594
3,039
69
5,702
 
4,769
2,726
94
7,589
Managerial TC  
- Wages 
(administration   
  labor) 
- Food costs 
- Firm facilities 
- Equipment 
- Special costs 
- Electricity 
- Staff/labor allowance
- Health costs 
- Spare parts 
- Telecommunications
- Maintenance 
- Official transport 
- Pension costs 
- Fire brigade 
- Security 
- Decision-making1 
Sub total 
 
3,088
99
252
213
181
738
2,304
262
34
61
2,271
29
992
7
71
-
10,602
 
 
4,046 
173 
327 
213 
196 
708 
3,395 
281 
32 
57 
2,276 
45 
1,814 
9 
45 
- 
13,617 
 
 
4,786 
122 
416 
187 
410 
850 
407 
1,085 
32 
64 
3,353 
50 
4,043 
10 
56 
- 
15,871 
 
5,994
20
448
252
314
1,176
3,118
504
39
64
4,413
55
4,671
6
65
-
21,139
 
10,825
31
436
1,057
2,410
1,677
5,004
606
32
58
3,356
95
5,240
5
1
256
31,089
Political TC 
- Taxes 
- Miscellaneous costs 
Sub total 
 
198
487
685
 
208 
415 
623 
 
287 
4,718 
5,005 
 
197
742
939
 
279
642
921
Total TC 13,580 19,916 26,996 27,780 39,599
Total costs (PC+TC) 30,567 40,792 62,659 63,269 64,789
 
Note:  Cost of decision-making process is taken from two sources: 
(i) in 2003, a Kebon Agung milling machine stopped 
temporarily (stopped operating) for 291 hours because of 
waiting for the machine spare parts that came late. From the 
total, 25 hours are operational stopping that was planned and 
266 hours were unplanned. As a result, Kebon Agung lost 
its chance to produce about 30 tons of sugar. If the total 
stoppage is multiplied by a sugar price of Rp 3140/kg, the 
transaction costs rise to Rp 110 million; and (ii) employees 
that had been contracted were not on duty during the time 
the milling machine was stopped. The employees are given 
wages of Rp 19,550/day with working hours being 8 hours 
(average Rp 2444/hour) and total employees reached 225 
people, so that the generated transaction costs reached Rp 
146 million. Thus, the total generated transaction costs from 
the stopped milling machine reached Rp 256 million (110 + 
225). The numbers in this table have been rounded  
Source: Own research (treated), 2005 
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If the composition of transaction costs is 
distinguished by its type, then the proportion of 
managerial transaction costs contributes the highest 
percentage to total transaction costs, reaching 78.5%. 
This is followed by market (19.2%) and political 
transaction costs (2.3%). This composition is 
reasonable because activities of sugar mills are mainly 
focused on the process of producing output so that 
most of the activities are related to production 
management. Market transaction costs of the sugar 
mill are associated with sugarcane farmers and related 
institutions, such as Smallholder Sugarcane Farmers 
Association (APTR), a cooperative, and banks. The 
sugar mill deals with government policy (political 
transaction costs) on taxes and other expenditures, 
such as contributions to road reconstruction, national 
days activities, and so on. Thus, this information 
shows that most of the transaction costs for the sugar 
mill relate to the managerial aspect. On this point, the 
corporate management model is very influential on 
the magnitude of transaction costs. The more efficient 
the management model is the smaller the managerial 
transaction costs will be, and vice versa: 
According to traditional economic theory, a firm 
can gain a competitive advantage through 
comparative cost of production by, for example, 
reducing labor cost. However, recent research 
from the management field suggests that 
nonprice factors are equally important determi-
nants of competitiveness. The range of nonprice 
is diverse and includes human resource 
endowment, such as skills; technical factors such 
as research and development capabilities and the 
ability to innovate; and managerial and organi-
zational factors, both internal to the firm and 
externally organized through relationships with 
other bodies, customers, suppliers, public and 
private research institutes, and other firms 
(CLARK and GUY, 1998). Briefly, KUMAR and 
CHADEE point out five factors identified as the 
most critical for the international competitiveness 
of enterprises, namely: (i) technology; (ii) human 
resources; (iii) organizational structure; (iv) 
government; and (v) the role of capital and 
finance. See Rajiv KUMAR and Doren CHADEE, 
Competitiveness of Asian Firms: An Analytical 
Framework, ERD Working Paper Series, No. 4, 
Asian Development Bank, 2002, p. 2         
 
Production and Transaction Costs in Ngadiredjo 
Sugar Mill 
The configuration of Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill 
production costs can be seen in Table 6. Some 
interesting things are: (i) the highest percentage of 
production costs is factory expenditure and 
processing, which reached Rp 25 billions in 2003. 
This number actually declined in 2002 because the 
total milled sugarcane decreased. Contribution of 
factory costs and processing reached 39% of total 
production costs. This high contribution is normal, 
because the core activity of a sugar mill is milling 
sugarcane, so that all production concentration is in 
the factory and processing. After that, the highest 
expenses are costs of planting, milling sugarcane, 
staff/labor allowance, fuel oil, and land preparation; 
(ii) costs to buy fuel increased almost 100% in 2003, 
compared to 2002. This was the result of the increase 
in fuel price in 2003 (determined by the government), 
and not by an increase in fuel consumption; (iii) 
expenditure for salaries/wages decreased a lot, about 
400% in 2003 compared with 2002. More 
interestingly, wage expenditure has been decreasing 
since 1999. Wages/salaries on this item are for 
workers who directly work in the production process 
(milling), who are generally paid by using the 
standard regional minimum wage (UMR). The 
declining wage/salary costs resulted from the reduced 
number of workers and better job planning; (iv) sugar 
packaging costs, including sacks also decreased a lot 
in 2003 due to the decline of sugar production 
compared to 2002; and (v) decreasing the amount of 
irregular (non-permanent) labor wage constitutes a 
good outcome that means management is willing to 
learn from previous experiences.  
 
Table 6.  Production Costs of Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mill (Rp million) 
Production Cost 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Sugarcane milling and 
water pump 
4,227 7,279 77 9,868 10,080
Factory, processing, 
and besali 
13,810 15,225 19,355 29,078 25,376
Fuel stasiun 884 1,190 668 1,491 3,080
Overtime honorarium - - 1,386 1,812 326
Fuel oil 1,213 1,281 2,955 3,289 6,037
Wages (irregular labor) 1,384 2,363 752 718 142
Packaging 1,379 1,525 2,072 2,408 1,670
Material & tools 1,604 1,520 1,774 1,766 1,553
Seed estate 735 996 1,283 1,463 461
Land preparation 1,892 2,317 2,101 3,553 4,356
Plant costs, fertilizer 
and material 
10,900 15,868 19,530 21,467 12,037
Total production cost 38,028 49,564 51,953 76,913 65,118
Note: The numbers in this table have been rounded  
Source: Own research (treated), 2005 
Meanwhile, concerning with the configuration of 
transaction costs in Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill, Table 7 
gives information as follows: (i) the highest 
expenditure was for staff allowance, approximately 
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Rp 7 billion, followed by general costs, maintenance 
and machine installation, TMA, and electricity; (ii) 
cut-and-carry costs declined by 28% in 2003 due the 
reduced amount of sugarcane milled in Ngadiredjo 
Sugar Mill; (iii) research and development (R&D) 
costs declined by 55% in 2003. This decline indicates 
that the attention of the sugar mill to R&D is less 
serious, despite its importance for the corporation’s 
innovation/improvement; (iv) there was an increase in 
corporate construction of 90% in 2003. Some 
construction costs were for building corporate and 
sugar mill staffs’ housing; (v) there were savings on 
electricity of almost 100% in 2003. Of course, this 
was a considerable efficiency for Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mill because in 2003 this item contributed 8% to the 
total transaction costs; and (vi) there was more than a 
100% increase on the donation item. This item is 
‘political illegal’ costs, because it is usually related to 
government interest.  
 
Table 7.  Transaction Costs of Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mill (Rp million) 
Transaction Cost 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market TC 
- Cut-load-carry 
- Transport cost 
- Smallholder  
   contract 
Sub total 
 
4,562 
1,181 
3,424 
 
9,167 
6,175
2,014
6,854
15,043
 
6,667 
2,421 
9,695 
 
18,783 
8,612
2,716
8,373
19,701
6,652
1,502
318
8,472
Managerial TC 
- Wages  
  (administration)  
- Firm facilities 
- General facilities 
- Car-vehicle 
- Outside of estate  
  cost 
- Overtime  
  honorarium 
- Manager and  
  administrative 
- Central electricity 
- Labor allowance 
- Staff allowance 
- General costs 
- Machine  
  maintenace  
  and installation 
- R & D 
- Right on land 
- Firm building 
- Cane security 
- Decision- 
   making1 
- Overlapping   
  activities2 
Sub total 
 
 
4,558 
- 
630 
1,904 
 
137 
 
- 
 
479 
443 
4,365 
1,747 
3,044 
 
 
3,175 
19 
- 
779 
36 
 
- 
 
- 
21,316 
5,542
-
744
1,884
187
-
398
476
4,176
442
3,598
3,660
30
-
577
50
-
-
21,921
 
 
3,157 
- 
902 
2,404 
 
259 
 
988 
 
- 
252 
5,023 
4,961 
4,400 
 
 
4,267 
52 
10 
1,163 
91 
 
- 
 
- 
27,929 
3,605
621
1,956
6,545
347
1,143
573
5,152
6,566
6,271
7,644
5,241
156
120
2,883
118
-
-
48,941
3,536
865
1,782
4,360
346
2,327
-
4,910
6,896
6,982
5,728
5,679
69
109
4,548
106
216
200
48,659
Political TC 
- Taxes 
- Tax duplication3 
- Donations 
- Security costs 
- Miscellaneous 
costs 
Sub total 
261
-
26
30
809
1,126
516
-
41
34
1,062
1,653
 
65 
- 
43 
21 
 
1,859 
 
1,988 
49
375
107
13
8,611
9,155
146
375
251
39
4,546
5,357
Total TC 31,609 38,617 48,700 77,797 62,488
Total costs 
(PC+TC)  
69,637 88,181 100,613 154,710 127,606
 
Note:  Cost of decision-making process was calculated from two 
sources: (i) in 2003 there were 200 workers in the milling 
division off duty for two months because the purchasing of 
a machine was late (as a result of management centra-
lization). Every worker was paid Rp 425 thousand/month 
despite being off duty (because they were bound in 
contract). In this case, Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill bore 
transaction costs of Rp 170 million; and (ii) in the 2003 
milling season, a machine was disturbed which resulted in 
operations stopping for 125 hours, which happened because 
some spare parts of the milling machines were late. As a 
result, Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill lost its chance to produce 
about 14.6 tons of sugar. If the total stoppage is multiplied 
by a sugar price of Rp 3,140/kg, transaction costs raise to Rp 
46 million (total is Rp 216 million). 
 2 Based on calculation of Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill 
Accountancy Unit  
 3 Cost of duplication tax is measured from water tax in 
milling season (for six months/180 working days). In the 
milling season water tax is imposed on Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mill by two government agents: Kediri Revenue Office 
(Dispenda) and a state-owned water firm (Perum Jasa 
Tirta). Each agency draws a tax of Rp 62.5 million/month 
for the same object. From duplication of this water tax, 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill bore total costs of Rp 375 million.  
 The numbers in this table have been rounded  
Source: Own research (treated), 2005 
 
Some important things to note from the compo-
sition of transaction costs in Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill 
are as follow. First, the magnitude of ‘miscellaneous 
costs,’ which are not well identified, reaches Rp 4.5 
billions Almost every sub-post expense consists of 
‘other cost’ (management usually takes 10% from the 
total of sub-post costs). But the accounting division 
does not know at all the use of these costs. These are 
considered ‘illegal costs’ where their use spreads out 
from contributions to directors, to top management, 
and illegal contributions/ payments to the government 
(local). These variables are still added with 
contribution to some other parts, which in 2003 
reached Rp 250 million (100% increase compared to 
2002). This kind of practice often happens in state-
owned enterprises (BUMN) in Indonesia, where 
corporations (including sugar mills) are charged with 
various illegal levies by (officials of) the government. 
Second, the sugar mill is also charged with high 
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transaction costs for car maintenance/buying and 
permanent labor wages, which require Rp 4.3 and Rp 
3.7 billion, respectively. Cost of cars’ maintenance/ 
buying that reaches 4.3 billion/year (even in 2002 
reached Rp 6.5 billion) is unreasonable. It indicates 
that a mark-up process has taken place in the process 
of buying the car, for which the BoD is usually 
responsible. The labor wage is considered very high 
because actually the number of permanent labors in 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill can be reduced, as stated by 
the Head of the Financial Unit of Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mill. 
Furthermore, if we differentiate the transaction 
costs by their types, then the proportion of managerial 
transaction costs makes the highest contribution to the 
total transaction costs, equaling 77.4%. This is 
followed by market transaction costs (14.2%) and 
political transaction costs (8.4%). This composition of 
transaction costs is generally similar to Kebon Agung 
Sugar Mill; however, in Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill the 
proportion of managerial transaction costs is very 
dominant, while in Kebon Agung Sugar Mill the 
proportion of market transaction costs is higher than 
in Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill. The component of 
managerial transaction costs that make the most 
dominant contributions are machine and installation 
maintenance, corporate building (renovation) and 
housing, electricity, general facilities, chief and staffs’ 
salaries/wages, incentives, and plants costs. The 
biggest component from market transaction costs is 
cut-load-carry (TMA) costs, both for self-sugarcane 
and farmers’ sugarcane. This data shows that the 
concentration of transaction costs for sugar mills is 
related to their management. 
 
Comparison of Production and Transaction Costs 
in Kebon Agung and Ngadiredjo Sugar Mills 
If the proportion of production and transaction 
costs is compared between Kebon Agung and 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mills, it is seen to be different. In 
Kebon Agung Sugar Mill, the majority of costs in the 
activities are in the form of transaction costs, which 
are 61.1%; the remaining were in the form of 
production costs in 2003 (Table 8). In Ngadiredjo 
Sugar Mill, the proportion of transaction costs in the 
activities is 49.0%. However, the high transaction 
costs in Kebon Agung Sugar Mill cannot directly be 
concluded as inefficiency of institutions, because 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill is incurred high costs for plant, 
land processing, and fertilizer. This happened because 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill, besides processing sugarcane 
from farmers, also plants sugarcane on its own land. 
Therefore, it also spends production costs in the form 
of land processing, planting, and fertilizer/seed, which 
decreased the proportion of transaction costs. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the proportion of costs at 
Kebon Agung Sugar Mill between 1999-2002 shows 
that the majority of costs in the activities are in the 
form of production costs (similar to Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mill). The composition change is caused by two 
things: (i) on the production costs side, variables of 
wages/salaries (for contract labor), fuel oil, land 
processing, and complements costs were decreasing 
in 2003; and (ii) on the contrary, on the transaction 
costs side, variables of transport subsidies, wage/ 
salaries, staff allowance, equipment, and special costs 
were increasing in 2003. The result is that the 
proportion of transaction costs to production costs 
was higher than in 2003. 
  
Table 8. Percentage Comparison of Production 
and Transaction Costs for Kebon Agung 
and Ngadiredjo Sugar Mills, 1999-2003 
(%) 
Kebon Agung Sugar Mill Comparison 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Production costs 
Transaction costs 
55.6
44.4
51.2 
48.8 
57.0 
43.0 
56.1
43.9
38.9
61.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill Comparison 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Production costs 
Transaction costs 
54.6
45.4
56.2 
43.8 
51.6 
48.4 
49.7
50.3
51.0
49.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Own research (treated), 2005 
 
Thus, actually, the configuration of transaction 
costs between Kebon Agung and Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mills is not significantly different. This is because the 
management models used in the two sugar mills are 
very similar, both for internal and external 
management. Internally, management in the two 
sugar mills are categorized into four divisions and are 
led by an administrator who has restricted authority. 
In the two sugar mills there are no planning and 
supervising divisions, so that evaluation cannot be 
conducted based on activities performed. As a 
consequence, the proportion of transaction costs is 
very high compared with production costs. 
Externally, management of the two sugar mills are 
only implementing what has been decided by the 
directors/corporation (PT. RNI for Kebon Agung 
Sugar Mill and PTPN X for Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill), 
both corporations being located in Surabaya (capital 
city of East Java). These very centralistic manage-
ment models make the decision-making steps long, 
which has potential to generate high managerial 
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transaction costs. This is the model of management 
applied in the two sugar mills, and it frequently 
happened that the material needed (as in the 
purchasing of chemical materials and spare parts for 
milling machines) came late because they had to wait 
for the BoD’s decision. As a result, in the case of 
lateness, the process of milling stopped, which 
generated the high transaction costs. 
More details about the configuration of 
transaction costs between Kebon Agung and 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mills are presented in Table 9. 
First, both in Kebon Agung and in Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mills, the most dominant transaction cost is 
managerial transaction costs. This is understandable 
because the managerial activities include almost all of 
the corporation’s main activities, such as the process 
of milling the sugarcane, staff salaries, and investment 
costs: 
In general, management of a sugar mill is 
governed with a conventional model. Good 
corporate governance has not already been fully 
run; even the financial report system has not yet 
followed modern standard accountancy. Moreo-
ver, the supervising function is not run by the 
management of the sugar mill. As stated by Adig 
SUWANDI, corporate secretary of PTPN XI, 
‘many people state that one of the causes of 
inability of the sugar industry based on 
smallholder farmers in Java is about manage-
ment.’ For details, see Adig SUWANDI, Saham 
Petani vs Rekayasa Sosial, Sugar Observer, No. 
24, 2003b, p. 3    
  
Second, market transaction costs in Kebon 
Agung Sugar Mill are higher than in Ngadiredjo 
Sugar Mill, 19.2% and 13.6%, respectively. Two 
alternative analyses are: (i) the considerably higher 
market transaction costs in Kebon Agung Sugar Mill 
are caused by the magnitude of activities related to 
other parties, especially sugarcane farmers. Kebon 
Agung Sugar Mill establishes cooperation with 
sugarcane farmers in the form of a partnership pattern, 
whose main purpose is to develop farmers’ sugarcane. 
For this partnership pattern, Kebon Agung Sugar Mill 
incurs considerably high costs. In addition, Kebon 
Agung Sugar Mill also provides high transportation 
subsidies to farmers in order for their sugarcane to be 
delivered to the sugar mill. In 2003, for example, 
Kebon Agung Sugar Mill allocated transportation 
subsidies up to Rp 5000/quintal of sugarcane, so that 
the total amount spent reached Rp 4.7 billion; and (ii) 
the internal management of Kebon Agung Sugar Mill 
is more efficient than Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill, which 
can reduce the managerial transaction costs. For 
example, machine and installation maintenance in 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill is Rp 2.3 billion higher than in 
Kebon Agung Sugar Mill. Electricity in Ngadiredjo 
Sugar Mill is Rp 3.5 billion higher than in Kebon 
Agung Sugar Mill. From this, it can be said that the 
internal management model in Kebon Agung Sugar 
Mill is more efficient than that in Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mill. This happened because Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill is 
a state-owned enterprise managed more centrally and 
there is no desire to maximize its performance.  
 
Table 9. Percentage Comparison of Transaction 
Costs’ Types in Kebon Agung and 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mills, 2003 (%) 
No Type of Transaction Costs Kebon 
Agung 
Ngadiredjo 
1 
2 
3 
Market transaction costs 
Managerial transaction costs 
Political transaction costs 
19.2 
78.5 
2.3 
13.6 
77.9 
8.5 
4 Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own research (treated), 2005  
 
Third, the proportion of political transaction costs 
does not contribute significantly to total transaction 
costs. However, the political transaction costs of 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill are higher than in Kebon 
Agung Sugar Mill because of many ‘illegal’ costs 
activities. Unfortunately, the researcher cannot 
calculate other costs that are possibly spent by the 
sugar mills for certain purposes. For example, it is 
assumed that the sugar mills help the Smallholder 
Sugarcane Farmers Association (APTR) in delivering 
farmers to perform demonstrations in Jakarta (capital 
city of Indonesia) to encourage the government to 
stop sugar import or increase the import tariff. The 
sugar mills (especially through their directors) are also 
assumed to give bribes to the government to get 
licenses for the importing of sugar: 
Of course, from an interview with the chief of 
APTR Ngadiredjo, every sugar mill certainly 
gives financial aids to APTR in its working area. 
The financial aids are usually utilized by APTR 
to send farmers to participate in demonstrations 
or are all taken by core officials of APTR. In this 
category, financial aids from the sugar mill may 
help APTR be in the position of giving support to 
the sugar mill. Then, big distributors often bribe 
APTR to support certain aims desired by 
distributors, for example, the government is 
encouraged to withdraw the import license policy 
of certain distributors. One signature from APTR 
may have value up to Rp 5 billion, as stated by 
the chief of Ngadiredjo APTR. If this logic is 
used, then certainly sugar mills are doing 
JURNAL MANAJEMEN DAN KEWIRAUSAHAAN, VOL. 9, NO. 1, MARET  2007: 1-17 
Jurusan Ekonomi Manajemen, Fakultas Ekonomi – Universitas Kristen Petra 
http://www.petra.ac.id/~puslit/journals/dir.php?DepartmentID=MAN 
14
something similar to get import incenses, 
especially state sugar mills because import 
licenses are only given to state sugar mills 
(PTPN) through SK Memperindag No. 
343/2002. If this notion is true, these costs, of 
course, can be classified as political transaction 
costs.    
 
The study of DE SOTO (1989) calls these 
expenditures ‘non-market transaction costs,’ such as 
resources spent in waiting, getting permits to do 
business, cutting through red tape, bribing officials, 
and so on. These non-market transaction costs are 
rampant in developing and transition economies, 
though the size of the official transaction sector is 
small (WANG, 2003:6). If such information can be 
gained, it may be that political transaction costs are 
higher than indicated by this data survey which has 
already been taken. 
Thus, the composition of transaction costs 
between Kebon Agung and Ngadiredjo Sugar Mills is 
not different, but market transaction costs in Kebon 
Agung Sugar Mill are relatively higher than in 
Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill. On this point, the conclusion 
that can be drawn is that the Kebon Agung Sugar Mill 
institution is relatively adaptive at relating to other 
parties, as can be seen from its structure of high 
market transaction costs. The high market transaction 
costs cannot directly be concluded as inefficient when 
they are useful to create certainty. In the case of 
transportation costs subsidies to sugarcane farmers in 
Kebon Agung Sugar Mill, compensation for the high 
transaction costs is made with the certainty that the 
sugar mill will get enough sugarcane. Without the 
transportation subsidies, sugarcane input will be 
uncertain, which could disturb the production process. 
On the other hand, the lower proportion of managerial 
transaction costs indicates that the internal 
management institutions of Kebon Agung Sugar Mill 
are better than those of Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill. This 
fact demonstrates that privately-owned enterprises 
contribute to improved performance of corporate 
management through giving more space to the CEO 
to make and implement strategic decisions.  
 
Corporate Governance Reform of Sugar Mills 
Research results strengthen the statement that the 
basic problem in sugar mills is management 
inefficiency resulting in high transaction costs. The 
structure of transaction costs in sugar mills, both in 
Kebon Agung and Ngadiredjo Sugar Mills, is that 
managerial transaction costs are proportionally higher 
than market and political transaction costs. Thus, 
every effort to reduce transaction costs should be 
started by improving corporate management design 
so as to raise institutional efficiency. In the context of 
sugar mills, there are at least two institutional 
problems causing management inefficiency. First is 
that the share ownership structure is concentrated on a 
few capital owners (both in state-owned and 
privately-owned sugar mills). As a result of this 
structure, control of management cannot be optimum. 
Second is a very centralized model of corporate 
governance, where the Board of Directors (BoD) 
holds the corporation fully.  
BERLE and MEANS were among the first to 
consider the relationship between a firm’s ownership 
structure and its performance. They asserted that as 
the diffuseness of ownership increases, the share-
holders become powerless to control professional 
managers. Further, they argued that, given that the 
interests of management and shareholders are not 
generally aligned, corporate resources are not used 
efficiently in maximizing corporate profit. Therefore, 
BERLE and MEANS suggested that the relationship 
between ownership concentration and performance 
should be a negative one. However, DEMSETZ argued 
‘that it is unreasonable to suppose that diffuse 
ownership has destroyed profit maximization as a 
guide to resource allocation.’ Instead, he asserts that a 
firm’s ownership structure is ‘an endogenous 
outcome of a maximizing process in which more is at 
stake than just accommodating to the shirking 
problem’ (as quoted by WELCH, 2003:288). 
With this theoretical framework, the spreading of 
share ownership is an alternative that can be 
implemented to reduce the concentration of share 
ownership in sugar mills. By doing so, control of 
management (CEO) will be easier because every 
owner expects that the management will work 
optimally. This is supported by HART’S statement 
(1995:681) that one of the strategies to effectively 
control management is to use the ‘large shareholders 
model.’ Given that small shareholders have little 
incentive to monitor management or launch a proxy 
fight, some commentators have suggested that one 
way to improve corporate governance is to ensure that 
a company has one or more large shareholders. One 
of the most appropriate to be considered as share 
owners in a sugar mill is sugarcane farmers, besides 
APTR, staff of the sugar mill, an investor, and local 
government (ARUM, 2000:41).  
This share ownership could be started with state-
owned sugar mills, such as Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill, 
because state-owned sugar mills have higher 
management concentrations (BoD) than do privately-
owned sugar mills. There are some aspects that 
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should be considered carefully in the process of share 
ownership for sugarcane farmers. First, the majority 
of sugarcane farmers are uneducated people, so they 
would have to be given an understanding about the 
consequences of share ownership. For example, every 
corporation can return a profit or loss, so that having a 
share does not guarantee a profit. Second, a monopoly 
over stock shares by rich sugarcane farmers (leaf 
farmers), who so far dominate the information and 
organization chain (APTR), must be avoided. 
Otherwise, share ownership will only benefit the few 
sugarcane farmers with big capital. Third, share 
ownership must be followed by corporate governance 
reform. Without corporate governance reform, the 
process of share ownership will not have significant 
implications for the sugar mill’s corporate impro-
vement. 
The unproportional job descriptions between the 
Board of Directors (BoD) and Chief of Executive 
Officer (CEO) causes the corporation (sugar mill) not 
to work well. For example, in the structure of a sugar 
mill, the BoD holds control over all decision-making 
processes, such as purchasing raw material and spare 
parts. As a result, milling operations often stop 
because the purchasing of spare parts is delayed. This 
happens because: (i) the office of the BoD is located 
in a different city (Surabaya) so that the process of 
decision-making takes a long time, and (ii) not all 
members of the BoD have technical competence in 
sugarcane issues so that the decisions made cannot be 
implemented quickly. For these reasons, the 
concentration of management control causes CEOs 
not to have incentive to make innovative improve-
ments in developing the corporation (sugar mill).  
In the long term, sugar mill management should 
implement corporate governance based on the 
stewardship model. Stewardship theorists argue that 
there is an important role for directors. Directors 
should empower governance structures and mecha-
nisms to maximize the benefits of a steward. For 
CEOs who are stewards, their pro-organizational 
actions are best facilitated when the corporate 
governance structures give them high authority and 
discretion (DONALDSON and DAVIS, 1991). Struc-
turally, this situation is attained more readily if the 
CEO is also chair of the board of directors. The CEO-
chair who is unambiguously responsible for the fate 
of the corporation will have the power to determine 
strategy without fear of countermand by an outside 
chair of the board. Thus, stewardship theorists argued 
that directors should play a greater role in facilitating 
and empowering managers instead of monitoring and 
controlling (as quoted by ONG and LEE, 2000:7).  
In other words, sugar mill management must be 
given space to plan, make, and apply the decisions so 
that there is incentive for them to work optimally. As 
stated by ALCHIAN and DEMSETZ (1972:788), more 
effective control of corporate activity is achieved for 
most purposes by transferring decision authority to a 
smaller group, whose main function is to negotiate 
with and manage (renegotiate with) the other inputs of 
the team. Meanwhile, the function of the BoD is 
simply to conduct control and evaluation of 
management performance (CEO). Of course, the 
BoD has authority to replace the CEO if at any time 
he/she fails to effectively run the corporation. In this 
way, technical problems such as provision of raw 
material, machine purchasing and investment 
planning can be done by the CEO without BoD 
approval. With the change in corporate structure, it is 
expected that transaction costs can be reduced, for 
example, by reducing the cost of decision-making and 
operation (sugar mill) delays as a consequence of 
lateness in the decision-making process. The BoD 
concentrates on empowering the CEO by giving 
incentives (rewards), authority, and trust.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
At the firm level, the components of managerial 
transaction costs are quite complicated. In addition to 
this, in the context of market transaction costs, sugar 
mills must also relate with many parties, such as 
sugarcane farmers, cooperatives, distributors, law 
institutions (notaries), banks, and so on. Sugar mills 
also deal with government policy adjustment 
(political transaction costs) in order to operate 
smoothly. Regarding this research, aspects of sugar 
mill managerial transaction costs can be grouped into 
two types. First, internal managerial transaction costs 
are transaction costs generated from the corporation’s 
internal management model, for example, salary 
policies, facilities, maintenance, and overlapping 
activities. Second, external managerial transaction 
costs are transaction costs generated related to the 
hierarchy of management in decision-making. In the 
case of sugar mills, in general sugar mill management 
(Chief Executive Officer/CEO) does not have full 
authority to make decisions (especially for state-
owned sugar mills) because all proposals must get the 
approval from the Board of Directors (BoD).  
In the context of sugar mill’s transaction costs, 
the important factor that should be reformed soon is 
the restructuring of corporate governance and 
supervision aspects. From this corporate governance, 
the main problem is the wide authority of the BoD to 
plan and enforce all corporate strategic decisions; 
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even technical activity is often done by the BoD (for 
example, tools purchasing). On the contrary, the CEO 
has almost no authority over the daily operational 
activities, except routine activity that has been decided 
by the BoD. With this condition, the rule of the game 
of the corporation (sugar mill) will not be efficient; for 
example, the process of decision-making is often late. 
Furthermore, the supervision function of the BoD 
does not run well, mainly because their position is far 
from the location of the sugar mill (the location of the 
BoD is in Surabaya and the sugar mills are in Malang 
and Kediri Districts). With the long distance, of 
course, the process of supervision does not run well. 
Ultimately, these problems have potential to raise the 
transaction costs in the sugar mills. 
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